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Abstract 
Even though differentiation has become a core feature of the EU, the grand theories have focused 
almost exclusively on uniform integration. In this paper, we derive hypotheses about differentiated 
integration from liberal intergovernmentalism, neofunctionalism, and postfunctionalism. In an analysis 
of EU treaty making between 1992 and 2016, we find evidence that heterogeneity of both wealth and 
identity, integration in the area of core state powers, and pre-existing differentiation drive 
differentiated integration. A comparison of the explanatory power of the grand theories shows that 
neo- and post-functionalism explain the differentiations that member states obtain in EU reform 
treaties more convincingly than liberal intergovernmentalism. A synthetic model performs best, 
however. The grand theories also leave noteworthy variation unexplained. 
 
Keywords 
European integration, differentiated integration, liberal intergovernmentalism, neofunctionalism, 
postfunctionalism 
 
Acknowledgments 
For comments on previous versions of the paper, we thank Liesbet Hooghe, Mareike Kleine, Gary 
Marks, participants at the workshop ‘Re-engaging grand theory’ at the EUI, May 2018, and two 
anonymous reviewers for JEPP. 
 
  
2 
 
Introduction 
Ever since the early 1990s, differentiated integration (DI) has become a core feature of the European 
Union (EU). We define European integration as differentiated if EU rules and policies are not legally 
valid in all member states – or not exclusively valid in member states. In internal differentiation, 
individual EU member states do not participate in specific EU policies. Either they enjoy opt-outs that 
free them from the obligations of membership, or they are excluded from the rights and benefits of an 
integrated policy. In external differentiation, non-member states selectively adopt EU policies. 
Whereas most differentiations are transitory, the two major post-internal market integration projects – 
monetary integration and the integration of interior (justice and home affairs) policies – began and 
have remained differentiated for more than 20 years. Successive enlargements and the Euro crisis have 
reinforced the institutional divide among the member states at the same time as non-member states 
have selectively integrated into the internal market (e.g., in the European Economic Area) and specific 
EU policies (such as Schengen or the European Research Area). In sum, the EU has developed into a 
‘system of differentiated integration’ (Schimmelfennig et al. 2015). Differentiated integration also 
plays a key role in current debates about EU reform. In principle, it offers a constructive alternative to 
stagnation, on the one hand, and disintegration, on the other. 
Yet the ‘grand theories’ of European integration have generally neglected its increasingly 
differentiated nature. They have focused on the big decisions to shift policy-making authority from the 
national to the regional level (intergovernmentalism), the general institutional and transnational 
dynamics that push integration beyond and above the initial intergovernmental agreement 
(neofunctionalism) and the constraining politicization that has developed in response to the deepening 
of integration (postfunctionalism).  
Whereas the original grand theories were formulated when European integration was still largely 
uniform, the debate of the 1990s between liberal intergovernmentalism (LI) and neofunctionalism 
(NF) took place after DI had already become a core feature of European integration (Kölliker 2006: 
38). Even though Moravcsik and Nicolaïdis (1999: 83) describe instances of differentiation in the 
bargaining processes of the Amsterdam treaty negotiations and call for elaborating bargaining theory 
to deal adequately with exclusions and opt-outs, LI has not treated DI systematically. Nor has NF, 
given its focus on centralizing spillovers. In their outline of a postfunctionalist (PF) theory of 
European integration, Hooghe and Marks explicitly mention opt-outs and cooperation among subsets 
of member states as institutional reforms to ‘lower the heat’ (2009: 22) – but PF mainly aims to 
explain why identity-driven politicization constrains European integration in general. 
In turn, the academic discussion of DI has long been atheoretical (in terms of social science or 
integration theory) and focused on describing specific cases, categorizing modes of DI and pondering 
its policy implications (Holzinger and Schimmelfennig 2012). More recent theory-oriented analyses of 
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DI have built on general theories such as collective-goods (Kölliker 2006), bargaining (Schneider 
2009) and spatial theory (Jensen and Slapin 2012), as well as Bourdieuian international political 
sociology (Adler-Nissen 2014), but not on the grand theories. Leuffen et al. (2013) derive conjectures 
on DI from the grand theories, but apply them to specific policy areas and integration cases, rather 
than testing them systematically. This is what we set out to do in this paper. 
Why re-engage the grand theories to explain DI? First, the grand theories continue to inform and 
structure academic debates about the ‘big picture’ and overall development of European integration. 
Because DI has become an important part of the big picture, the grand theories should have something 
to say about differentiation. Second, the grand theories offer all the building blocks of a complete 
theory of DI, from the sources of the social demand for DI via the institutional context of negotiations 
to the institutional implementation of differentiation. In that they differ from the existing theory-
oriented analyses, which often focus on parts of the process only, or on the effects (rather than the 
causes) of DI (Kölliker 2006; Jensen and Slapin 2012; Adler-Nissen 2014). 
In the theoretical section of the paper, we derive hypotheses on DI from the three grand theories that 
this special issue features: neofunctionalism, (liberal) intergovernmentalism and postfunctionalism. 
We postulate key conditions and mechanisms of differentiation that follow from the theories’ general 
assumptions and propositions on European integration. In particular, we add the heterogeneity of 
preferences and capacities and the supranational institutional context as relevant conditions of DI.  
In the empirical section, we test these hypotheses on a dataset of treaty-based DI. In line with the 
general approach of the special issue, we seek to determine the ‘contributions of each theory in its own 
terms’ but also treat them as partially compatible, complementary and overlapping theoretical 
perspectives ‘on a multifaceted phenomenon’ (Hooghe and Marks, this issue). We find, indeed, that DI 
is substantially correlated with explanatory factors suggested by all grand theories: international 
heterogeneity of wealth and identity, the integration of core state powers, domestic constraints by 
Eurosceptic parties and the prior existence of differentiation in integrated policies. In addition, 
however, a synthetic model composed of all factors outperforms any individual grand theory.   
The paper makes three major contributions. First, it elaborates the grand theories of European 
integration so that they can account for the distinction between uniform and differentiated integration. 
Second, it moves beyond existing work on DI, including our own (Schimmelfennig and Winzen 2014; 
Winzen and Schimmelfennig 2016), by explicitly engaging the grand theories to explain 
differentiation. Empirically, we include new analyses to assess the individual and joint explanatory 
power of the grand theories and the extent of variation left to be explained by other approaches. Third, 
it does so by testing hypotheses based on the grand theories against an encompassing dataset of DI 
(rather than individual case studies). We find that, with minor adjustments, the grand theories are 
flexible enough to cover differentiation as an additional outcome besides uniform integration and the 
status quo both theoretically and empirically. 
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Grand theories and differentiated integration: conditions, mechanisms and hypotheses 
In contrast to theories of European policy-making, theories of European integration focus on 
institutional change in the EU polity: the integration of new policy areas and member states and shifts 
in competencies between the state and the union and between the institutional actors of the EU. 
Traditionally, the grand theories have covered the choice between the status quo and more (or less) 
uniform integration. Here, we expand the choice set to include DI. Starting from the core propositions 
of the grand theories, we theorize why and how member states opt for or end up with differentiated 
instead of uniform integration. 
There is general agreement in the literature that demand for DI results from increasing heterogeneity 
of preferences and capacities among the member states (Holzinger and Schimmelfennig 2012). 
Because the major decisions in European integration require unanimous agreement, uniform 
integration is likely if the member states have compatible integration preferences and are capable of 
helping each other realize these preferences. By contrast, if states and societies have incompatible 
goals – and side payments or issue linkages cannot overcome them – or if they lack the administrative 
or economic capacity for effective cooperation, individual member states are likely to veto further 
integration. This outcome, however, leaves one subset of member states dissatisfied: those with 
compatible integration preferences, sufficient integration capacity and an interest in further integration. 
By exempting or excluding states that are either unwilling or lack the capacity to integrate further, DI 
provides a remedy. In sum, DI accommodates heterogeneity by leaving some states at the status quo 
while others integrate (further). 
The grand theories can easily integrate heterogeneity into their frameworks. They do not need to 
change their basic assumptions about what motivates social groups and states for or against 
integration. The only element they need to add is that heterogeneous or divergent preferences or 
capacities do not necessarily result in deadlock but create an opportunity for differentiation, depending 
on conducive bargaining situations and institutional settings. 
Yet the grand theories differ on the relevant sources of heterogeneity and the conditions for realizing 
the demand. Whereas LI and NF feature the heterogeneity of economic preferences and capacities, PF 
emphasizes heterogeneity in national identities. And whereas LI focuses on intergovernmental 
bargaining power to explain DI, NF highlights the supranational institutional setting, and PF brings in 
domestic constraints – above all referendums and Eurosceptic parties.  
In the following sections of the theory part, we describe the conditions and mechanisms of DI for each 
grand theory in more detail and formulate testable hypotheses. For reasons of space, we refrain from 
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repeating their general assumptions and propositions on European integration (see Hooghe and Marks, 
this issue; Schimmelfennig 2018; Wiener et al. 2019). 
 
Liberal intergovernmentalism 
LI argues that the relevant heterogeneity in preferences and capacities is mainly economic. On the one 
hand, heterogeneity arises from the divergence of interests in the market-making and market-
correcting policies that the EU pursues (Moravcsik 1993: 487). Generally, governments aim to ‘secure 
commercial advantages for producer groups, subject to regulatory and budgetary constraints’ 
(Moravcsik 1998: 38). Depending on how competitive these powerful producers are on the regional 
market, states demand either market liberalization or protectionist policies. Moreover, they push for 
regulatory policies that benefit domestic producers. In market-making commercial policies, 
competitive position is paramount. Export-oriented sectors support market expansion and 
liberalization, whereas import-competing sectors seek protection from outside competitive pressures. 
To the extent that market-correcting policies affect competition, a similar logic prevails. Producers 
from high-regulation, high-standard national economies prefer a similar level of regulation in the EU 
to counter the competitive advantage of competitors from low-regulation states; those from states with 
weak regulation or weak standards oppose high-level harmonized standards to keep their competitive 
advantage. Finally, net contributors to the EU budget oppose the extension of EU subsidies, whereas 
net recipients favour an increase in EU expenditure (Moravcsik 1993: 495; Thomson 2011: 136-7). 
On the other hand, heterogeneity arises from variation in state capacity. As a decentralized polity with 
weak central administrative capacity, the EU relies on its member states for the implementation of its 
policies. Administrative capacity has proven a robust factor in the explanation of member state 
compliance with EU law (Toshkov 2010). As administrative capacities of member states become more 
diverse, high-capacity member states are likely to become more reluctant towards integration for fear 
of unequal policy implementation undermining policy efficiency and the EU’s level playing field. 
A good empirical approximation of the major cleavage generating heterogeneity is wealth (Bailer et al. 
2015; Thomson 2011: 148-55). Wealthier countries are more likely to have competitive, export-
oriented sectors, to start from higher regulatory standards, and to be net contributors to the EU budget. 
Therefore, they typically favour more integration on market expansion and liberalization, EU-wide 
regulatory standards, and restrictions on EU transfers and expenditure. In addition, wealth goes 
together with higher state capacity. Correspondingly, wealthier states are likely concerned that poorer 
states lack the capacity for effective integration, especially in areas of integration that require 
significant administrative, financial and technical capacity. In sum, LI expects heterogeneity of 
preferences and capacities to arise mainly between rich and poor states.  
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As the wealth gap between member states widens, demand for differentiation increases. For instance, 
rich states seek opt-outs from redistributive policies or push for the exclusion of poorer, low-capacity 
member states from policies that demand high administrative or economic capacity. Conversely, 
poorer states are interested in exemptions from costly regulatory rules. 
Domestic economic interests most clearly shape state preferences, the ‘more intense, certain, and 
institutionally represented and organized’ they are (Moravcsik 1998: 36). These conditions are most 
likely to be present in EU policies related to the internal market. In other policy areas, in which 
outcomes do not have strong and clear economic implications, and the relevant domestic 
constituencies are weak or diffuse, state preferences – and their international heterogeneity – are 
harder to predict for LI or more likely to follow ideological beliefs (Moravcsik 1998: 486-9; 
Moravcsik and Nicolaïdis 1999: 61).  
Under which circumstances can states realize their demand for DI? In the LI perspective, the 
intergovernmental distribution of bargaining power is the key factor. The sources of bargaining power 
are unequal preference intensity and unequal mutual dependence. Unequal preference intensity results 
from differences in how satisfied governments are with the status quo. Unequal mutual dependence 
results from differences in how much member state governments need each other to attain their goals – 
and in the credible outside options (alternatives to European integration) that they possess. Because 
negotiations on integration require unanimous intergovernmental agreement, governments with lower 
preference intensity and dependence can credibly threaten to block agreement unless their integration 
preferences are met (Moravcsik 1993: 499-502).  
Governments with superior bargaining power are in a promising position to realize their differentiation 
preferences if other member states want to move beyond their preferred level and scope of integration. 
First, they can obtain exemptions (‘opt-outs’) from integration steps in exchange for foregoing their 
veto. Second, they can insist on excluding countries from integration, which do not share their policy 
preferences or do not meet their standards of capacity.  
Wealthier states are typically more satisfied with the status quo and less dependent on (additional) 
international cooperation than poorer countries. They are therefore more likely to realize their DI 
demand. In the LI perspective, heterogeneity of wealth is therefore the main structural condition of DI. 
It not only creates general demand for DI, but also allows the more affluent states to impose DI on the 
less affluent ones. We thus derive a simple hypothesis from LI: 
(LI) DI increases with the heterogeneity of wealth among EU member states. 
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Neofunctionalism 
LI and NF share the assumption that explanations of differentiation in European integration need to 
start from the compatibility of societal, efficiency-oriented and predominantly economic interests. 
While generally emphasizing the compatibility of ‘modern’ economic and social systems and 
pluralistic societal structures as a prerequisite for integration (Haas 1961), NF has remained vague in 
explaining the specific interests that shape integration preferences and the power of interest groups in 
affecting integration outcomes. Indeed, Moravcsik’s liberal reformulation not only moved 
intergovernmentalism closer to neofunctionalism, but also contributed a more precise analysis of 
societal preferences and power (Caporaso 1998: 9-10). Accordingly, theorists of European integration 
working in the tradition of NF such as Paul Pierson (1996) accepted that LI provided an adequate 
account of initial integration. For these reasons, we assume NF to share LI’s wealth-based hypothesis 
about differentiated integration.  
In addition, however, NF puts strong emphasis on the endogenous dynamics of integration. Integration 
generates new supranational and transnational actors, institutions and interdependencies that affect the 
subsequent integration process independently of the original intergovernmental preference and power 
constellations. In the NF perspective, it is therefore relevant for the future development whether a 
policy is integrated uniformly or differentially.  
First, DI facilitates decision-making on further integration. In a context of uniform integration, in 
which all member states are represented, the international heterogeneity of preferences and capacities 
is larger, and agreement is harder to achieve, than in a context of DI, in which states are already 
grouped by similarity of preferences and capacities. Decisions on further integration are easier to take 
if preference or capacity outliers are already exempted or excluded. Consequently, however, the 
integration gap between the status quo- and the integrationist member states is likely to widen over 
time (Jensen and Slapin 2012). 
Second, uniform integration establishes supranational actors such as the European Commission, 
Parliament, and Court, which typically prefer integration to be uniform and therefore constrain DI. By 
contrast, supranational actors created for differentially integrated policy areas – such as the European 
Central Bank – are likely less committed to uniformity. Third, in spite of the established practice of 
differentiation, uniformity is still the EU norm. This norm is weaker, however, in policy areas, which 
have been differentially integrated from the start.  
Finally, path-dependence (Pierson 1996) affects situations of uniform and differentiated integration 
differentially. In a situation of uniform integration, path-dependence locks in uniformity and creates 
incentives for uniform further integration. If prior integration has put states on two different paths, 
however, sunk costs and endogenous interdependence may propel states onto divergent integration 
trajectories and increase the costs of changing path (Schimmelfennig 2016). Path-dependence locks in 
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uniform and differentiated integration equally. For all these reasons, prior uniform integration inhibits 
DI, where prior DI facilitates subsequent DI. In addition to sharing the LI hypothesis on heterogeneity 
of wealth, NF thus suggests a general hypothesis about the dynamics of DI: 
(NF) Differentially integrated policies are more likely to generate additional differentiation. 
 
Postfunctionalism 
Both LI and NF assume a functional or instrumental logic of integration. By contrast, PF is based on 
the assumption that organizations represent communities of culture and identity. As community 
beings, individuals have a fundamental interest in the collective self-determination of their community 
(Hooghe and Marks 2016). In addition, PF starts from the observation that European integration has 
become politicized domestically. It has become more visible and salient for citizens. It has created 
economic and cultural integration winners and losers, polarized attitudes and debates on the EU, and 
helped to form a new political cleavage between supporters and opponents of openness and 
integration. Finally, Eurosceptic parties have mobilized this integration cleavage, transformed national 
party systems, and made important electoral gains in many European countries. In the course of the 
politicization process, integration has shifted from the ‘interest group arena’ and its ‘distributional 
logic’ to the ‘mass arena’ with its ‘identity logic’ (Hooghe and Marks 2009: 9).  
Correspondingly, in a PF perspective, the relevant international heterogeneity stems from 
incompatible integration preferences based on national identity. Specifically, 'the more exclusively an 
individual identifies with an in-group, the less that individual is predisposed to support a jurisdiction 
encompassing outgroups’ (Hooghe and Marks 2009: 12). Thus, Euroscepticism increases with the 
share of individuals with exclusive national identities, and demand for DI increases with the variation 
in the exclusiveness of national identities across member states. Heterogeneity of identity is most 
relevant in issue-areas pertaining to community self-determination and solidarity, comprising ‘core 
state powers’ (Genschel and Jachtenfuchs 2014) such as internal and external security, which define 
the sovereignty of the state, but also migration and welfare policies. 
Accordingly, ‘nationalist’ societies are likely to demand opt-outs from integration agreements, 
especially from non-market policies in the area of core state powers, or to push for the exclusion of 
societies in need of solidarity. As status quo-oriented actors, they are also generally in a promising 
bargaining position to realize their preferences. In addition, they can leverage domestic constraints. 
Generally, the ‘constraining dissensus’ on European integration is most effective, the more directly 
mass politicization affects EU negotiations and their outcomes. This is most clearly the case in 
countries, in which the ratification of European treaties by referendum is mandatory or customary and 
in which Eurosceptic parties threaten governments with mobilization against European treaties 
(Hooghe and Marks 2009). We thus derive four postfunctionalist hypotheses on DI. 
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(PF1) DI increases with the heterogeneity of national identity among the EU member states.  
(PF2) Integration in the area of core state powers increases the likelihood of differentiation.  
(PF3) Member states with stronger Eurosceptic parties are more likely to obtain opt-outs.  
(PF4) Member states that ratify EU treaties by referendum are more likely to obtain opt-outs.  
In the theoretical section of the paper, we elaborated the grand theories in order to explain 
differentiated rather than uniform integration. By building on their main assumptions, conditions and 
mechanisms of European integration, we sought to remain as close as possible to the original 
formulation of the theories. Even though the exponents of the grand theories did not explicitly cover 
DI, small theoretical adjustments – in particular regarding the relevance and nature of the international 
heterogeneity of integration preferences and capacities and regarding the variation in supranational 
institutional context – proved sufficient to generate testable hypotheses about DI. 
This exercise has confirmed the partially competing, overlapping and complementary perspectives of 
the grand theories. For one, LI and NF share the hypothesis that heterogeneity of economic interests 
and capacities, following from heterogeneity of wealth, is the main driver of differentiation. In 
addition, however, NF brings in prior uniform integration as a constraint on further differentations, 
and prior differentiation as a facilitator. By contrast, PF constitutes an alternative rather than an 
addition to the LI hypothesis. Heterogeneity of national identities rather than heterogeneity of wealth 
drives DI, and domestic rather than supranational institutional factors affect to what extent the demand 
for DI is realized. Yet even LI and PF are partly compatible and complementary. Whereas LI assumes 
that its explanation of DI is strongest in economic integration, PF focuses on the integration of core 
state powers. 
 
Analysis: EU Treaty-making since Maastricht 
Differentiation and differentiation opportunities  
We analyse differentiated integration in EU treaties from the Treaty of Maastricht (1992) to the 2016 
intergovernmental agreement on the Single Resolution Fund, the latest reform treaty. We limit our 
analysis to treaties among the EU member states, because these treaties codify the big integration 
decisions that the grand theories focus on. And we start with the Treaty of Maastricht, because it 
marks the beginnings of differentiation as a persistent feature of European integration. 
We set up our analysis from the perspective of individual member states. Member state governments 
participate in intergovernmental negotiations and they may conclude these negotiations with one or 
more opt-outs from the policies that were subject to reform. In this way, individual member states 
generate differentiated European integration. Importantly, to speak of an intergovernmental 
negotiation can be deceiving as these processes involve negotiations on many policy areas. In the 
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Maastricht Treaty, for instance, 28 policy areas were reformed. We consulted reports on all EU treaty 
reforms by the European Commission and Council of Ministers to identify the policy areas that were 
explicitly on the agenda of intergovernmental conferences (Table A1 in the appendix provides an 
overview). Hence, saying that member states can conclude intergovernmental negotiations with opt-
outs means that this can happen in each negotiated area.  
We design our analysis in close correspondence to these considerations. We observe the negotiation 
outcomes of each member states, in each policy area, negotiated in each reform treaty. We call this 
combination a ‘differentiation opportunity’. In the aforementioned Maastricht Treaty, each member 
state thus had 28 differentiation opportunities and creates 28 corresponding observations in our data. 
We are aware that our theoretical arguments provide a stylized account of a complex bargaining reality 
involving package deals as well as policy and country idiosyncrasies that we cannot fully measure, 
although we will try to adjust our analysis for such unobserved sources of diversity.  
To continue our example of the Maastricht Treaty, how do we establish whether a member state 
concluded the negotiations on any of the 28 policies with an opt-out? Here we consult the formal 
treaty outcomes of the negotiations. We identify whether, according to the text of the treaties, the rules 
of a given policy area bind a given member state. If the member state is exempted fully or partially 
from the rules, we classify this as an opt-out or case of differentiation. For example, the British opt-out 
from the Maastricht Treaty provisions on the Eurozone are found in a legally binding protocol 
attached to this treaty. These pieces of information are found in the EUDIFF1 dataset 
(Schimmelfennig and Winzen 2014). 
Importantly, in every treaty negotiation, we only code an opt-out if a country is exempt from new 
rules. If a treaty creates new rules in a policy area, and a country fully participates in these rules, we 
do not code a differentiation, even if the country has active opt-outs in this policy area from previous 
reforms. It is of course likely that pre-existing differentiation has knock-on effects but these are 
distinct from our dependent variable. 
Furthermore, we consider as differentiation cases in which countries achieve desired exemptions and 
in which they are excluded from policy regimes against their will. This may seem controversial as 
exemptions and discrimination could result from different explanations. However, first, discrimination 
is very rare in reform treaty negotiations, unlike in enlargement. Since all countries have to vote in 
favour of a reform treaty, it is difficult to adopt discriminatory differentiation against anyone’s will. 
Discriminatory differentiation occurs predominantly in the case of recent new member states that enter 
treaty negotiations with active, discriminatory opt-outs (e.g. exclusion from the Eurozone) and are 
then also excluded from reforms (e.g. the reform of the Eurozone). We keep these cases of 
discrimination in the analysis, even though exemptions are the norm in reform treaties, since some 
theories describe exactly these lasting consequences of initial differentiation. However, we also 
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examine the implications of excluding the most recent accession countries and thus nearly all cases of 
discriminatory differentiation. 
 
Variables and data 
Our theoretical arguments lead us to expect that certain country and policy characteristics increase the 
chances that a country obtains an opt-out in a given policy negotiation or differentiation opportunity. 
First, LI emphasizes ‘heterogeneity of wealth’ as a driver of differentiated integration. At the country-
level, the argument implies a U-shaped relationship between the wealth of states and national opt-outs. 
Both the richest and poorest members of the EU are likely to obtain exemptions or be excluded from 
further integration. This leaves the average countries in the EU as the least-likely candidates for 
differentiation and suggests that the probability of differentiation outcomes increases the more 
countries deviate from average EU wealth. Consequently, we measure a country’s absolute distance 
from the member state average in wealth. In terms of data, our measure is taken a year before a 
differentiation opportunity and relies on gross national income (GNI) per capita, in purchasing power 
adjusted 2011 constant international dollars based on World Bank data.1 
The NF expectation is that differentially integrated policies generate further differentiation. A 
differentially integrated policy is one in which, at the time of a negotiation, some member states 
already have existing opt-outs from previous reform treaties. From the NF perspective, it is important 
that there is a precedent of differentiation in the policy area and not which specific member state has 
set this precedent. Moreover, the degree of prior differentiation might matter too: is there only one or 
are there many cases of opt-outs in force? Therefore, we operationalize this variable at the policy level 
as a count of instances of differentiation in a policy area at the time of a reform treaty negotiation. 
The PF hypotheses require several variables. To operationalize ‘heterogeneity of national identity’ 
(PF1) at the country-level, we measure exclusive national identity based on Eurobarometer surveys. 
The Eurobarometer asks respondents whether they feel ‘exclusively national’ rather than ‘national and 
European’, ‘European and national’ or ‘European only’ (Table A2 in the Appendix shows the surveys 
that we use). We assess the percentage of respondents feeling ‘exclusively national’ in each member 
state. As for PF2, following Genschel and Jachtenfuchs (2014: 10), core state powers are policies that 
are closely linked to sovereignty due to their ‘institutional significance for state building’ (Table A1 in 
the Appendix shows our classification). 
For Eurosceptic party strength (PF3), we measure the seat-weighted average EU position of all 
government parties. We derive party positions from the Chapel Hill and Leonard Ray expert surveys 
                                                          
1 GNI correlates very closely (r>.97) with GDP. However, unlike GDP, this measure avoids distortions in some 
years regarding Ireland. In GDP/capita terms, Ireland appears as the wealthiest European country (except for 
Luxembourg) (see also Financial Times 2015). 
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(Ray 1999; Steenbergen and Marks 2007; Bakker et al. 2015). These surveys ask experts to rank 
parties in terms of their leadership’s stance on European integration. The Chapel Hill Surveys do not 
cover Cyprus, Malta, Luxembourg and Estonia (before 2006). Finally, we code whether a member 
state ratified a treaty by referendum (PF4). 
Not counting observations for which we miss data on the explanatory variables, our data encompasses 
1795 observations nested in 24 member states, 40 policy areas, and 9 treaties. The Appendix shows 
summary statistics (Error! Reference source not found. A3).2 
 
Relationships between differentiation and the explanatory variables 
We begin to explore the plausibility of the theoretical expectations by examining bivariate 
relationships. First, LI suggests a U-shaped relationship between wealth and differentiation, as both 
rich and poor member states tend to negotiate exemptions or face discrimination. Figure 1 shows the 
expected U-shaped relationship, albeit only tentatively. Many of the post-2004 Central and East 
European accession countries drive this pattern on one end due to their many exemptions (e.g. from 
EU state aid policy) and significant discrimination (e.g. regarding the free movement of workers). 
Rich member states such as Britain, Denmark and Sweden constitute the other end of the inverted-U. 
However, the pattern is tentative as there are many uniformly integrated wealthy countries.  
 
Figure 1. Differentiation and wealth 
 
From the NF perspective, the decisive question is whether early reform treaties have created a 
precedent of differentiation in a policy area. The ensuing institutional dynamics are likely to generate 
knock-on effects over time. Figure 2 reveals strength and weaknesses of this argument. On one hand, 
                                                          
2 For the statistical analysis, we standardize the continuous variables so that they take the value zero at their 
mean and unit changes correspond to standard deviations. The summary statistics (Table A3) show the original 
mean and the size of one standard deviation as reference points. 
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institutional precedent plausibly accounts for highly differentiated treaty outcomes and, in particular, 
the reforms of the Economic and Monetary Union in the Lisbon Treaty and a series of subsequent, 
issue-specific bargains culminating, for the time being, in the Intergovernmental Agreement on the 
Single Resolution Fund. 
 
Figure 2. Differentiation in differentially integrated policies 
 
Note: For ease of presentation, only selected observations have labels. 
 
Yet, NF struggles with some cases. First, it is by definition partial as it cannot account for the initial 
choice for differentiation. The EU has often relied on differentiation to introduce new policies such as 
the Schengen Area, monetary union and foreign and security policy in the Maastricht Treaty, or the 
Area of Freedom, Security and Justice in the Amsterdam Treaty. Precedent does not explain 
differentiated integration in these cases. Second, the NF expectation does not explain significant 
uniformity in cases in which extensive existing opt-outs would have suggested otherwise. The most 
salient cases are found in the area of enlargement. All post-2004 new members were excluded from 
the free movement of workers and services but these cases of special treatment expired over time and 
did not trigger follow-up effects in the Lisbon Treaty. It should be noted, however, that enlargement 
differentiation is temporary by design due to institutional factors and in this sense less out of touch 
with the NF expectation than our aggregate perspective can reveal (Schimmelfennig 2014). 
The PF expectations highlight the role of exclusive identity conceptions, Euroscepticism and core state 
powers. These relationships appear to be borne out by the evidence as countries where citizens identify 
exclusively with the nation (Figure 3) and with Eurosceptic governments (not shown) tend to negotiate 
national opt-outs more than other member states. However, the high levels of differentiation of the 
Central and East European member states do not fit the argument satisfactorily in most cases, although 
countries such as the Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary where nationalism has been on the rise in 
recent years may gradually come to fit the PF perspective better than shortly after their accession.  
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Figure 3. Differentiation and exclusive identity 
 
However, the strongest argument in favour of PF is that differentiation in reform treaties can be found 
almost exclusively in core state policies (Figure 4). There are exceptions such as the British opt-out 
from the Social Policy Protocol of the Maastricht Treaty and a few free movement of capital 
exemptions. There also are some additional cases of differentiation outside of core state powers in 
secondary legislatione.g. regarding the distribution of agricultural subsidiesbut post-Maastricht 
legislative differentiation generally also concentrates on core state policies (Winzen 2016). Hence, 
with some exceptions, the core state policy context comes as close to a necessary condition for 
differentiation in EU reform treaties as one could reasonably expect to find.  
 
Figure 4. Differentiation across EU policy domains 
 
Overall, this first exploration lends plausibility to all theoretical perspective and underlines some of 
their weaknesses. LI and PF pinpoint important structural factors that help explain initial choices for 
differentiated integration in EU reform treaties. Yet, LI and its economic focus do not seem to fully 
capture the policy context of contemporary national opt-outs, which PF with its focus on core state 
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powers does better. PF in turn does not satisfactorily address the differentiated integration of relatively 
poor member states. NF, finally, sheds light on the institutional and temporal context of opt-outs but 
not on why they emerge in new and previously undifferentiated policy regimes. 
 
Comparing and combining the Grand Theories 
The previous section suggests that the grand theories have different strengths and weaknesses in 
explaining differentiation. Here we examine the empirical success of each individual theory and a 
combination of them. 
 
Figure 5. Statistical results 
a) LI model d) Full models 
 
 
b) NF model 
 
c) PF model 
 
Note: All models rely on 1795 observations from 24 countries, 40 policy areas, and 9 treaties. The figure shows mean parameter 
estimates with 95%-Highest Posterior Density Intervals (HPDI). RE model: Multilevel random effects model. SD: Standard 
deviations of random effects.  
 
Figure 5 summarizes the results of the statistical models that form the basis of this section. Panels a) to 
c) derive from three logistic regression models in which the explanatory variables of each theory 
predict the likelihood that a country negotiates an opt-out. In principle, the results are as expected: 
Deviations from average EU wealth, differentially integrated policies, exclusive identities, Eurosceptic 
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parties, and core state polies are positively related with differentiation. Only the association of DI and 
referendums is rather uncertain. 
In addition, Figure 5 shows two combined models. One of these models makes an effort to control for 
unobserved treaty, policy and country differences by using a multilevel structure with random effects 
for these clusters. The full models generally confirm the findings although uncertainty is greater in the 
multilevel modelthis model does not assume that the observations are fully independent. We discuss 
the models in technical terms in the appendix.  
We explore these results further by examining the magnitude of the relationships (see Figure 6).3 If 
countries deviate from EU wealth much more than normal (two standard deviations correspond to 
8.000 USD in per capita income) the probability of a differentiation is 40 percentage points higher 
than for countries close to the EU average. The relationships are about equally substantial for other 
key variables, if somewhat weaker for identity, and more uncertain for Eurosceptic parties. In line with 
previous comments, whether a referendum takes place or not does not tell us much about 
differentiation outcomes. Overall, all theories thus highlight substantially important relationships. 
 
Figure 6. Relationships between explanatory variables and differentiation 
a) Wealth b) Diff. integrated policy c) Identity 
   
d) Party EU support e) Core state policy f) Referendum 
   
Note: The figure shows predicted probabilities that were simulated based on the full, multilevel model (see panel d) in Figure 
5). Panel a)- d) show changes in predicted probabilities for different values of the variable. Solid line: Median predicted 
probability. Dark area: 70%-HPDI. Light area: 95%-HPDI. The other panels show distributions of predicted probabilities. 
 
                                                          
3 These predicted probabilities assume a mildly differentiation-prone country, policy, and treaty as a baseline.  
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We might also evaluate the theoretical expectations in terms of whether they accurately tell us when 
and where differentiation happens. Since differentiation is, overall, rare, all theories predict a large 
number of outcomes correctly (i.e. as no differentiation) but how well do they pinpoint the few 
positive cases? To establish this, we have to set a threshold to say that a case should be classified as 
positivefor instance, if we predict a differentiation probability of 50 percent, we could say a case is 
predicted to have a differentiation outcome. Then we can compare this prediction with the actual 
outcome. We applied this strategy for all thresholds. Figure 7 shows how many positive cases the 
different models identify correctly (panel a)) at each threshold.  
 
Figure 7. Comparing classification performance 
a) Which model identifies most  
cases of DI? 
b) Performance and precision  
of the random effects model 
  
 
The results contain two insights. First, at any threshold, LI identifies the fewest opt-outs, followed by 
NF and PF that perform similarly. Clearly, however, a full model vastly outperforms any individual 
model by as much as 30 percentage points for many thresholds. For relatively low thresholds, the full 
model captures some 60 percent of all cases of DI. As the threshold becomes higher, we predict very 
few positive cases and therefore also capture few positive outcomes.  
Second, the multilevel model does best by far. It additionally makes few false predictions (panel b)). 
For most thresholds, 80 percent of the positive predictions prove correct. This means that estimating 
the impact of different countries, policies, or treaties in addition to the explanatory variables adds 
significant explanatory power. Another way of thinking about this is that significant variation on these 
levels of analyses remains to be explained in more substantive terms. While our quantitative 
perspective obviously cannot account for all factors such as policy-specific externalities (Kölliker 
2001), the large extent to which the multilevel model improves classification indicates blind spots of 
the grand theories.  
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Finally, we use the full model to examine the additive effect of favourable differentiation conditions. 
Consider cases such as the British or Polish involvement in Eurozone reforms. These countries differ 
from average EU wealth, maintain national currencies, feature Eurosceptic governments, and citizens 
with exclusive identities. What differentiation probability do we expect in such cases? As Figure 8 
shows, a differentiation outcome is very likely under favourable conditions and exceedingly unlikely 
in the opposite scenario. Combining the variables of all grand theories thus generates strong 
expectations, in particular as to the most likely candidates for differentiation. 
 
Figure 8. Favourable and unfavourable differentiation scenarios 
 
Favourable conditions: 
Distant from avg. wealth 
Strongly differentiated policy 
Strong national identity 
Weak party EU support 
Core state power 
Referendum 
  
Unfavourable conditions: 
Close to avg. wealth 
Weakly differentiated policy 
Weak national identity 
Strong party EU support 
No core state power 
No referendum 
Note: Distance/proximity to EU wealth, strongly/weakly differentiated policy, strong/weak identity, and party support are 
measured as the 75th/25th percentile of the respective distributions. 
 
We present several additional analyses in the appendix. First, we show results for different subsets of 
the data: Only the EU15 member states, only the area of core state powers, and only the EU15 in the 
area of core state powers (Figure A1). The findings are generally very similar but are weaker or more 
uncertain, in some configurations, for exclusive identity and differentially integrated policies. Second, 
as our statistical models were estimated in a Bayesian framework, they entailed mild prior 
assumptions. We show that varying and relaxing these assumptions does not affect the results 
substantially, although it does lead to greater uncertainty (Figure A2). Third, we operationalized 
differentially integrated policy as a dummy variable (does at least one country have an existing opt-out 
in a policy area) and find that this measure does not consistently relate to differentiation in contrast to 
the continuous variable included in the main analyses. The extent of prior differentiation seems to be 
important.  
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Conclusions 
The grand theories of European integration formulate conditions and mechanisms of the establishment 
and development of integration. To this day, they shape the academic (and academically informed 
policy) debate on the drivers and dynamics of the EU. Yet they have not paid specific attention to the 
development of differentiation, which has become a central and persistent feature of European 
integration since the 1990s.  
This paper suggests that the grand theories of European integration make a valuable contribution to the 
explanation of differentiated integration nonetheless. First, they are rich and flexible enough to put 
forward explanatory factors and produce testable hypotheses on DI. Second, the empirical analysis has 
largely corroborated these hypotheses. In line with both liberal intergovernmentalism and 
neofunctionalism, we provide evidence that heterogeneous economic structures and preferences 
generate demand for DI. So does variation in the strength of national identities, in line with 
postfunctionalist assumptions. In addition, we find that wealthier governments are more likely to 
realize their demand for differentiation (LI), prior differentiation generates or facilitates subsequent 
differentiation (NF) and strong Eurosceptic parties increase the probability of DI (PF). 
Correspondingly, our analysis shows that all grand theories make a substantially important and 
accurate contribution to the explanation of DI. A comparative assessment of explanatory power shows 
that the neofunctionalist and post-functionalist models outperform the LI model. This is the case even 
though we removed ‘wealth’ from the NF model and attributed it exclusively to LI. This finding 
highlights the relevance of institutional context, integration dynamics, and post-functionalist political 
constraints for explaining DI in European reform treaties. The institutional dynamics of differentiated 
integration have been particularly visible in the reforms of the Eurozone, from the European Stability 
Mechanism to Banking Union, which have widened the institutional gap between Euro-area and non-
Euro-area member states. Whereas the LI and PF models point to important initial conditions of 
differentiation (economic heterogeneity and identity-driven Euroscepticism, respectively) and PF 
additionally highlights the essential importance of the core state power context, both theories fail to 
appreciate the relevance of EU-level institutional dynamics. 
We conclude, however, that we can learn most about DI from a composite or synthetic model. First, as 
we point out in the theory section, there is overlap across the hypotheses of the grand theories on DI. 
Moreover, as the descriptive analyses illustrated, the theories have complementary strengths and 
weaknesses. Second, DI proves to be associated with factors derived from all grand theories. Adding 
up the favourable and unfavourable conditions put forward by the three theories generates strong 
predictions about differentiation. Third, the composite model outperforms all single-theory models in 
terms of identifying cases of differentiation correctly. We also noted, however, that treaty, policy and 
country variation above and beyond the expectations of the grand theories remains, suggesting that 
other theoretical perspectives could fruitfully be explored in addition. 
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The synthetic model finally suggests reasons why differentiated integration will remain highly relevant 
in the future as a strategy to overcome integration deadlock. Economic and cultural heterogeneity 
among the member states is unlikely to diminish significantly; the most pressing current reform issues 
affect core state powers such as migration policy, border security and fiscal policy; and these issue 
areas feature an entrenched institutional history of differentiation.   
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